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THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION OF INTERSTATE CONFLICTS: 







While arbitration remains more common than mediation as an alternative to litigation in 
domestic legal disputes, the opposite occurs in resolving violent interstate conflicts, 
where third-party mediation represents the most frequently employed method of conflict 
resolution. In order to understand the similarities and differences between international 
and domestic mediation, this article identifies key attributes of international conflict 
management generally and third-party mediation of violent disputes specifically, and four 
critical patterns commonly found in third-party mediation of international conflicts. 
These patterns, each of which is illustrated with a vignette involving US foreign policy, 
include: 1) the complex role of mediator bias in interstate conflict mediation, 2) the 
multiple actors and actions frequently associated with interstate conflict resolution, 3) 
mediator strategy and outcomes and 4) the importance of selection effects for 
understanding the deceptive appearance of interstate conflict mediation’s effectiveness. 
Understanding these processes and recognizing these patterns helps to develop a better 
understanding of the strengths and weakness involved in the third-party mediation of 
interstate disputes. 
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Mediation is fast becoming a standard tool for resolving domestic legal disputes, 
both in and out of court: “there is nothing alternative about mediation in the courts 
anymore.”
1
 Although both mediation and arbitration rely on self-determination,
2
 it is 
likely that domestic legal scholars and practitioners are more familiar with arbitration and 
adjudication than mediation. Interestingly, in the resolution of violent interstate conflicts, 
the opposite is the case; scholars and practitioners tend to be much more familiar with 
mediation which is widely utilized
3
 and less familiar with arbitration and adjudication, 
which are less frequently employed.
4
 
In particular, third party mediation of violent interstate disputes has led to both 
spectacular successes (e.g. the more than thirty years of peace between Egypt and Israel 
following the mediation of American President Carter that led to the Camp David 
accords)
5
 and costly failure (e.g. the inability of the 1948 UN Commission for India and 
Pakistan to facilitate peace, a conflict that remains ongoing and deadly).
6
  
Many interstate conflicts involve the use of, or threatened use of force, which can 
lead to high stakes and costly mistakes for both the chief belligerents and their allies. 
Unlike domestic legal systems that have enforceable obligations, international conflict 
resolution occurs in a world of international anarchy with no guaranteed enforcement 
mechanisms. As a result, all outcomes have to be self-sustaining.
7
 That is, meditation 
success requires that after a voluntary agreement is reached, actors continue to believe 
that it remains in their interest to implement the peace settlement. Yet despite these 
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 Although there appears to be increasing familiarity among the legal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
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demanding requirements, mediation is by far the most common form of violent 
international dispute conflict management.
8
 
What can we learn from studying international conflict mediation? Developing a 
better understanding of the conduct, role and influence of third-party mediation of violent 
or potentially violent disputes between nation-states helps to clarify its unique and 
common attributes and as a result, sheds light on its relationship to domestic mediation.  
Comparing third-party mediation of interstate conflicts and the domestic 
mediation legal disputes, one sees that the two forms of dispute resolution contain 
attributes that are:  
 
1) Similar (e.g. both emphasize consensual agreements)  
2) Seemingly Similar, but Actually Different (e.g. both can 
result in agreements, but they have categorically 
different enforceability)  
3) Seemingly Different, but Relationally Similar (e.g. 
contrasting the threat of war and litigation)  
4) Different (e.g. an international dispute mediator’s 
mandate has no clear applicability in domestic 
mediation).  
 
To examine the dynamics of interstate mediation I analyze four critical topics: 1) 
the complex role of mediator bias in interstate conflict mediation, 2) the multiple actors 
and actions frequently associated with interstate conflict resolution, 3) mediator strategy 
and outcomes and 4) the importance of selection effects for understanding the deceptive 
appearance of interstate conflict mediation’s effectiveness.  
A central attribute of international dispute mediation is its lack of formulaic 
procedures and the wide variation in procedures and practices conducted by mediators in 
different disputes and management efforts. I use vignettes from United States’ foreign 
policy to illustrate the wide-range in mediation practices. Focusing on the variation that 
occurs within one country helps to make clear the dramatic differences observed derive 
from the nature of mediation and not the culture, legal practices, or circumstances of a 
particular country. The vignettes include: 1) mediator bias (US-Iran/Algeria), 2) multiple 
actors and actions (Yugoslavia/Dayton Accords); 3) strategy and outcomes (Russo-
Japanese/Roosevelt) and 4) selection effects (Israel-Palestine/Clinton & Obama). Before 
looking at these four topics and their examples, however, it is necessary to explore both 
the process of international conflict management generally and the specific attributes of 
international conflict mediation in greater detail. 
 
I. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT9 
Conflict is without doubt one of the most pervasive and costliest of all social 
processes. It represents the systematic and organized employment of force and violence. 
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 See JACOB BERCOVITCH & SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW 
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Conflict management is an attempt to do something about reducing, limiting or 
eliminating the level, scope and intensity of violence in conflict, and building a structure 
where the need to resort to violence in future conflicts is controlled. Conflict management 
takes on various forms. It can be unilateral, where one party simply avoids conflicts or 
withdraws from any emerging conflict or it can be bilateral and involve the disputants in 
direct or tacit negotiations. Conflict management can also be multilateral, where an 
outside party, organization or states intervene peacefully to help the adversaries with their 
conflict management efforts. Whereas conflict can be largely a coercive interaction, 
conflict management is largely non-violent and incorporates a considerable degree of 
voluntary coordination and joint decision making between the parties in conflict. Hence, 
the importance scholars attach to understanding conflict management. 
 
A. Conflict Management 
How then does mediation fit into the overall framework of conflict management? 
Many policy tools are available for parties in conflict, these include, conflict prevention, 
conflict management (e.g. reaching a political settlement), and conflict resolution (e.g. 
resolving all outstanding issues in conflict). Some of these methods are enumerated in 
Article 33 (1) of the United Nations Charter, and they generally fall into four different 
categories: (i) the use of force and coercive measures (ii) judicial and legal processes (iii) 
formal and informal bilateral methods, and (iv) various forms of non- coercive third party 
interventions (these may be undertaken by a host of actors). These four ways of 
managing conflicts correspond roughly to power-based approaches to conflict 
(deterrence, sanctions), rights-based approaches (appeals to legal norms), and interests-
based approaches (searching for common interests through bilateral negotiation & third 
party mediation). Each approach has different features, characteristics, objectives, 
consequences, each entails different costs and resources, and each may be appropriate for 
different conflicts. 
 Mediation is by far the most common form of peaceful third party intervention in 
violent international conflicts. It is predicated on the need to supplement conflict 
management, not to supplant the parties’ own efforts. Although mediation has become an 
integral part of many systems (e.g. labor-management, family disputes), it is a form of 
conflict management that is particularly well suited to the international conflict 
environment with its numerous and diverse political actors all interacting in an anarchic 
environment to obtain scarce resources or achieve influence, and where each guards its 
interests and autonomy jealously, and accepts any outside interference in their affairs 
only if it is strictly necessary and explicitly circumscribed.  
 
B. Mediation in Different Types of Conflicts 
It is critical to differentiate between interstate conflicts (between two or more 
states) and civil conflicts (also known as intrastate conflicts) when examining conflict 
management. 
10
 As Melin and Svensson put it, “international mediation in intrastate and 
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interstate conflicts are substantially different.”
11
 While recent scholarly attention focuses 
on the mediation of intrastate, or civil disputes, such as the civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,
12
 interstate disputes, such as the conflict between India and Pakistan 
over Kashmir,
13
 represents 40% of modern conflict management efforts
14
 and are the 




C. Defining Mediation 
Mediation represents a form of joint decision making in conflict in which an 
outsider controls some aspects of the process, or indeed the outcome, but ultimate 
decision making power remains with the disputants. Mediation is best seen as an 
extension of bilateral conflict management. It is a rational, political, though at times 
risky, process with anticipated costs (e. g. time spent mediating) and benefits (e.g. 
achieving a reputation as a successful mediator). It operates within a system of exchange 
and social influence whose parameters are the actors, their communication, expectations, 
experience, resources, interests, and the situation within which they all find themselves. 
Mediation is a reciprocal process; it influences, and is in turn influenced by and 
responsive to, the context, parties, issues, history, and environment of a conflict.
16
  
 A satisfactory definition of mediation has to capture the broad and comprehensive 
features of the process and be relevant to studies of disputes, wars, and crises, such as 
those included in this book. Here I use Bercovitch’s definition of international dispute 
mediation as a “process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ 
own efforts, whereby the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or 
accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect 
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 See Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and 
Civil Wars, 35(3) INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 250 (2009). 
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 For a discussion of civil war conflict management research, see generally Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil 
War Conflict Management, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 71-84 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012). 
 
13 For a discussion of the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan and American efforts to manage the 
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AND BACK (2013). 
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 The systematic collection of data requires the existence of critical similarities across observations.  “No 
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and civil wars to enable mediators to build appropriate strategies and resources needed to bring an end to 
those wars through robust agreement implementation.” See Karl DeRouen et al., Civil War Peace 
Agreement Implementation and State Capacity, 47(3) J. PEACE RES.333, 344 (2010).  The key then is to 
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 The data in this study came from, JACOB BERCOVITCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
DATASET (2002).  The International Conflict Management dataset is still considered by some – more than 
twenty years from its inception – as “the best and most complete collection of data on international conflict 
management.”  PAUL DIEHL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 31.  The International Conflict Management dataset 
originally collected critical information about mediators, disputes and disputants on 184 mediation cases 
between 1945 and 1989. 
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or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force, or invoking 
the authority of the law.”
17
 This is a broad definition indeed that includes a wide range of 
conflict resolution actions.  
The mediation of international conflict represents a process whereby disputants 
work with a third party to reach a mutually acceptable peace agreement. Mediation is 
voluntary and contractual, differing significantly from other third party resolution 
processes such as arbitration, which are binding and judgmental. In particular, in 
mediation the third party assists the disputants in their search to find a peaceful outcome 
but cannot “impose a solution.”
18
 As a result, the disputants’ adherence to any settlement 
is also voluntary and needs to be self-sustaining in order to endure. The lack of 
enforceable outcomes fundamentally differentiates international dispute mediation from 
legal-based dispute adjudication. As Carbonneau states, “Enforcement is a lifeblood of 
any adjudication.” 
19
 The role of binding, enforceable outcomes is elemental to 
arbitration: “Final and binding awards are critical to the very utility and systemic 
effectiveness of arbitration. The inability or failure to enforce awards robs the arbitration 
process of its core practical value. Without the likelihood of conclusive finality, there is 
little, if any, reason to consider, let alone choose, arbitration.”
 20
 Mediation in contrast is 
completely voluntary as both a process and an outcome. While this non-binding process 
may sound tentative, the mediation of international disputes is the most common and, in 
many ways, the most powerful and profound form of international conflict resolution, 
peacemaking and conflict prevention. 
The practice of settling conflicts through a third party has a rich history in all 
cultures.
21
 In international relations, mediation is likely to be used in some, though by no 
means all, conflicts. It is particularly useful when a conflict has gone on for some time, 
when the efforts of the parties involved have reached an impasse, when neither party is 
prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute, and when both parties 
are ready to engage in direct or indirect dialogue, and are prepared to accept some form 
of external help and surrender some control over the process of conflict management. 
22
 
Because international conflict mediation follows no formulaic set of procedures, it 
is especially important to explore its patterns to gain an understanding of its dynamics. 
Jacob Bercovitch’s, The International Conflict Management, dataset (2002), codes 5,066 
conflict management efforts from about 1950 through 2000 and represents one of, if not 
the best dataset on interstate conflict mediation. Putting this all together one can see by 
the numbers the importance of mediation in international conflict management. Conflict 
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 See Jacob Bercovitch, The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations, in 
MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jerry Rubin eds., 1992). 
 
18
 See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, Becoming “Investor-State Mediation, 1(1) PENN ST. J. L. & 
INT’L AFF. 86, 90 (2012). 
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 See id. at 419-20. 
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 See generally P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS (1979). 
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management efforts include: no management (1.3% - an offer to manage was made but 
not accepted), mediation (59.3%), direct negotiation (32.2%), arbitration (.6%), referral 
to international organizations for processing (3.6%) and multilateral conferences (3%). 
States are more likely to negotiate together without third-party assistance: bilateral 
negotiation represents 46.6% of interstate but only 22.5% of intrastate resolution events. 
Conversely, mediation represents 70.2% of intrastate, but only 43.2% of interstate 
conflict management efforts. States versus state disputes are more than three times more 
likely to employ arbitration than disputes involving non-state actors, but the figures are 
very small (1.1% vs. .3%). 
 
II. International Conflict Mediation 
Mediation, domestic or international, consists of Mediators (also known as third-
parties), Disputants, a Dispute, and Outcomes. Examining mediation’s actors, actions and 
context together facilitates the development of an understanding of conflict management 
in general and mediation specifically. “To gain a better understanding of mediation we 





Disputants can choose from a variety of types of mediators: individuals, (e.g. 
Jimmy Carter), states (e.g. New Zealand), regional organizations (e.g. Organization of 
African States), and international organizations (e.g. the UN). Mediation by individuals 
who do not represent their government (like former President Carter’s current actions) is 
rare. In the post–Cold War, the United Nations has become active in dispute resolution, 
undertaking about a third of all conflict management efforts as shown by recent efforts in 
Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Angola, East Timor, and Rwanda. 
Regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and 
the Arab League act as mediators about half as often as international organizations. State 
mediation usually involves the official services of current or former leaders. For example, 
Presidents Roosevelt and Carter and Secretaries of State Kissinger and Christopher each 
represented the US as dispute mediators. States, through their representatives, are the 





International conflict can occur in almost any combination involving states and 
non-state actors. Here, because the focus is on interstate conflict, the disputants are states. 
Most disputes start with two main belligerents, each of which may invite in allies to 
support their case (who tend to honor prewar agreements in the majority of conflicts).
24
. 
Third parties can act as allies or mediators. Looking solely at variation between states, the 
key attribute is regime type: democracy or non-democracy. While definitions of 
                                                 
23
 Jacob Bercovitch, International Mediation, 28(1) J. PEACE RES. 3, 6 (1991). 
 
24
 Brett Ashley Leeds et al., Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises, 44(5)  J. 




democracy vary, it is well documented that democratic and non-democratic states fight 
wars with similar frequency, but democratic states rarely, if ever, fight each other.
25
 
Interestingly, in only two percent of the interstate mediation efforts are both of the 
belligerent states a democracy; while in 34.8% both are states are non-democracies. 
 
C. Disputes 
Interstate disputes cover a range of topics: territory (27.5%), ideology (5.8%), 
security (32.5%), colonial (7.9%), resources (5.5%) and ethnicity (20.8%). States tend to 
mediate other states; interstate dispute mediators are: individuals (2.3%), regional 
organizations (19.5%), international organizations (28.4%) and other states (49.8%). 
Over 47% of the interstate disputes mediated are in the highest category of fatalities 
(10,000 dead or more). There is a preventative theme though, as 28.8% of the mediated 
disputes are in the lowest level of fatalities (0-500), with the remainder in between. 
Interstate mediation occurs throughout the world; regional frequencies are: Central and 
South America (11.2%), Africa (16.8%), South West Asia (9.1%), East Asia and the 
Pacific (15.1%), the Middle East (33.6%) and Europe (14.9%).  
 
D. Outcomes 
Conflict resolution efforts lead to some type of an agreement in 45.5% of 
interstate and an almost identical 44.3% of intrastate disputes. The nature and durability 
of these agreements, however, vary considerably. The conflict management of interstate 
disputes results in more than twice as many ceasefires (9.9%) as intrastate disputes 
(4.8%), and slightly more full settlements and fewer partial agreements. Interstate 
disputes agreements, however, are more robust. Almost twice as many intrastate as 
interstate agreements fail immediately (5.9%) compared to (3.2%). Critically, while 




                                                 
25
 Extant literature provides a compelling assessment that while democratic dyads rarely (if ever) go to war 
(using a variety of definitions of democracy). Democracies and non-democracies are equally war-prone. 
For a discussion of these patterns, see generally Patricia L. Sullivan & Scott Sigmund Gartner, 
Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes, 32(1) INT’L INTERACTIONS. 1 (2006); 
Scott D. Bennett & Allan C. Stam, The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration, 42(2) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 344 (1998); William J. Dixon, Democracy and the 
Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict, 88(1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 14 (1994); Zeev Maoz & Nasrin 
Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1989); Zeev 
Maoz & Bruce M. Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, 87AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 624 (1993); JAMES RAY, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1995); Dan Reiter & 
Allan Stam, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377 (1998). 
 
26
 Rothchild calls the time immediately following a settlement the “treacherous transition period.” DONALD 
ROTHCHILD, THE TWO-PHASE PEACE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS IN AFRICA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEMOCRATIZATION 3 (2002). A critical aspect of the peace process is to “make it over the hump” and give 
settlements time enough to take hold and alter the underlying political situation fueling the dispute.  
Gartner, supra note 10. Short-lived dispute settlements fail to provide the political space and time necessary 
for the new institutions and policies to gain traction. Eight weeks is considered a critical duration for peace 




III. PATTERNS OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT MEDIATION 
 Recent studies of mediation have identified critical new patterns that reflect 
important concepts and approaches and dramatically improve our understanding of the 
roles and effects of international dispute mediation.
27
  I focus on four key insights: 1) the 
conflicting expectations of the impact of mediator bias, 2) the roles of multiple mediators 
and mediation efforts and agreements; 3) the influence of mediation strategy on dispute 
outcomes, and 4) the obfuscation of the actual mediation dynamic created by selection 
effects. 
A. Bias28 
Impartiality and fairness in conflict resolution rely upon two pillars of natural 
justice: nemo judex in sua causa (no one should be judge in his own cause), and audi 
alteram partem (no person should be judged without the right to be heard).
29
 Bias derives 
from a mediator’s interest in the conflict.
30
 The term “bias” is often used interchangeably 
with “prejudice” and is typically defined as a tendency that affects an actor’s capacity to 
act impartially. The U.S. Supreme Court refers to bias in its capacity for influencing 
judicial prejudgment.
31
 Bias, in turn, can create a harmful conflict of interest whenever 
there is the possibility that a judge or mediator might lack independence and impartiality. 
Even the appearance of bias alone can undermine voluntary conflict resolution.
32
  
Traditional and alternative dispute resolution systems have developed a toolbox of 
methods to address actual or suspected bias. Judiciaries depend on upon voluntary recusal 
standards which in turn rely upon self-policing by the decision maker whenever there is a 
question of bias. In arbitration each party often appoints an arbitrator and together the 
two party-appointed arbitrators select a third who serves as the chair. It is assumed that 
the two party-appointed arbitrators will be biased but that an independent and impartial 
chair will mitigate this bias.
33
 Domestic mediation is often supported by these bias 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is there Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from 
Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 32(4) INT’L INTERACTIONS 329 (2006). 
 
27
 For a more extensive discussion of these new concepts, see BERCOVITCH & GARTNER, supra note 8. 
 
28
 This section draws from the writing of Benjamin Premack in Scott Sigmund Gartner & Benjamin 
Premack, Mitigating Conflicts of Interest in Regional Governmental Organization Civil War Mediation, 
31(4) WISC. INT’L L.J. 785 (Winter 2014). 
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 For a discussion of mediator interests, see Molly M. Melin, The Impact of State Relationships on If, 
When, and How Conflict Management Occurs, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 691 (2011). 
 
31
 Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267-68 (2009) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 
U.S. 35 (1975)). 
 
32
 Sun, supra note 29, at 251; see also DAWN M. EVANS, How to Identify and Avoid Conflicts of Interest, 
STATE MICH. BAR (2011), https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/Articles/conflictsofinterest.pdf (last 





mitigation tools, as well as others such as the creation of screening walls to control the 
spread of confidential information within an organization.
34
  
But, unlike domestic mediation, there are opposing views about the effects of 
mediator bias on peacemaking.
35
  
On the one hand, traditional views hold that neutrality of the third-party 
intervener is absolutely crucial to any mediation; neutrality, it is argued, is vital to the 
promotion of trust between disputants and third-parties.
36
 This view claims that 
impartiality remains as necessary for an effective judiciary internationally as 
domestically.
37
 The United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
article 10 declares that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charge against him.”
38
 This reflects the common law ideal that 
conflict resolution decision makers should reach their conclusions “utilizing facts, 
evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria while putting aside personal biases, 
attitudes, emotions and other individualizing factors.”
39
 In these arguments, mediation 
legitimacy is contingent on the neutrality of the third-party. Analyzing the effect of a 
biased mediator on conflict management, some claim that third-party bias can decrease 
disputants’ willingness to participate in conflict resolution,
40
 limit peacemaking 
effectiveness,
41
 and restrict disputants to less effective conflict management processes.
42
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 Paul M. Lurie, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation: Using Screening Walls and Advance Waivers 
to Manage Mediation Conflicts of Interest, 24 INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., March 
2006 at 1, 56-58; see also Christopher J. Dunnigan, The Art Formerly Known as the Chinese Wall: 
Screening in Law Firms: Why, When, Where, and How, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 291-306 (1998). 
 
35
 For a discussion of this topic, see Sinisa Vukovic, Strategies and Bias in International Mediation, 46 
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 113 (2011). 
 
36
 Gartner, supra note 10, at 3. 
 
37
 Debra Lyn Basset & Rex R. Perschbacher, Perceptions of Justice: An International Perspective on 
Judges and Appearances, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 136, 138-39 (2013) (citing R. Matthew Pearson, Duck 
Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance & Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799 (2005)). 
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 Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.5 (1994). 
 
40
 Melin & Svensson, supra note 11, at, 255. For a broader discussion of mediation bias see J. Michael 
Greig & Patrick M. Regan, When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept 
Mediation in Civil Wars, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 759 (2008). 
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 For an example of an analysis that employs this perspective, see Bernd Beber, International Mediation, 





On the other side, mediator bias is considered to be an important positive 
determinant of the outcome of mediation efforts. Arguments in favor of this view 
highlight that a third-party with special interests in a conflict, who is close to one party, 
has an incentive to see its successful resolution and is likely to succeed.
43
 Bias is not an 
undesirable characteristic and does not necessarily make a mediator less successful, as 
pro-neutrality scholars hold, rather “impartiality is neither an indispensable condition of 
their [mediators’] acceptability, nor a necessary condition for the successful performance 
of an intermediary’s function.”
44
Looking at the effect of bias on mediation, these scholars 
argue that bias increases the likelihood of mediation success,
45
 and claim that biased 
mediators are more effective and more successful than neutral mediators.
46
 While the role 
of bias continues to be debated by scholars, one thing is clear: mediator bias in 
international violent dispute resolution has variable and complex effects
47
 as can be seen 
by looking at the role of bias in settling the US/Iranian Hostage Crisis. 
 
Mediator Bias: Algeria and The US hostages in Iran 
On November 4, 1979 Iranian students over-ran the US embassy and took 66 
State Department personnel hostage.
48
 Six months later, the United States attempted a 
rescue mission that failed to free the hostages and led to the death of eight Americans in 
the desert of Iran.
 49
The US State Department personnel remained hostages for 444 days, 
only to be released by Iranian officials following extensive negotiations facilitated by 
Algeria. How did the competing roles of bias operate in these negotiations? 
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Algeria’s intermediary role that led to the release of American hostages in Iran 
provides an interesting case of analyzing mediator bias. Algeria was known to have close 
ties to Iran, but despite this position, was acceptable to both the US and Iran as 
mediator.
50
 This case has been frequently cited as supportive of the view that mediator 
bias can be as important as any other attribute of the third-party in determining the 
success of mediation efforts. 
Mediator bias, it is argued, contributed to the successful outcome of Algerian 
mediation of the American hostage crisis in Iran. Citing this case, it was noted that “real 
bias can play an important role in mediation when the bias adds to the mediator’s 
capacity and desire to influence. A mediator may have access to the other side, and the 
potential to deliver concessions and agreements, despite an apparent bias.”
51
 Rather than 
act as a deterrent, mediator bias in this sense exerts a positive influence to the mediation 
process. 
Following on this point, mediator bias can work to positively affect negotiations 
in three ways: aiding “communication”, “developing creative proposals”, and “bringing 
the two parties’ positions into convergence.”
52
 Thus, American acceptance of Algeria’s 
mediation was not because the latter was thought to be impartial, rather, Algerian “ability 
to gain access to people close to Khomeini held promise that it might help to release the 
hostages.”
53
 Partiality in this particular case was the primary reason both parties, the 
Iranians and Americans, accepted the third-party mediation of Algeria. 
Iran’s acceptance of Algerian mediation can also be understood to be founded on 
three sources: Algeria’s solidarity, revolutionary credentials and Islamic tradition. These 
factors all point to a perceived bias by the Iranians of the Algerian negotiating team 
(ostensibly in the former’s favor) as a crucial determinant in the outcome of the hostage 
negotiations.
54
 This ties in with some arguments made that cultural ties do facilitate 
mediation.
55
 Algeria’s partiality towards Iran may be understood as based on a shared 
cultural context. Its influence in the negotiation process may derive from this cultural 
connection. 
In addition, Algeria’s successful mediation in the hostage crisis suggests 
impartiality, or lack thereof, on the part of the mediator does not necessarily preclude 
effective mediation efforts. Rather, trust of the mediator by both parties can be equally, if 
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not more, important. The weaker party (Iran) may have viewed Algeria, a small state 
mediator, “as an ally who recognises the difficulty in negotiating from a weaker 
position.”
56
 This bias notwithstanding, the Algerian negotiating team was able to earn the 
trust of disputant parties, which led to its acceptance as mediator and the outcome. 
Another hypothesis takes it further when explaining the relationship between 
mediator bias and the outcome of negotiations, which is applicable to this case. Mediator 
bias can be an attractive option when the mediator has close ties to one party (in this case 
Iran) in the dispute. The other party that does not have as close a relationship (the US) 
with the mediator accepts the biased mediator with hopes or expectations that the 
mediator will use his/her partiality to influence the adversary and thereby deliver an 
outcome.
57
 Algeria’s relatively strong ties with Iran in this case worked in getting 
accepted as mediator and also bringing both sides to the negotiating table. 
In conclusion, the Algeria mediation case suggests that a biased mediator can be 
equally, or in some cases, even more effective than neutral ones, illustrating a major 
divergence from traditional, domestic mediation norms and practices. 
 
B. Multiple Actors & Actions 
 The “final” peace settlement that we observe terminating hostilities is often the 
result of scores of (often invisible) earlier conflict resolution efforts, many that led to an 
agreement or failed, as well as dozens of broken or partial agreements all of which was 
facilitated by many different mediators. The large number of actors and efforts is 
especially prevalent after the end of the Cold War, which has seen a dramatic increase in 
both peacemaking actors and interventions.
58
 For example, the number of international 
conflict resolution efforts increased 500% in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.
59
 
 In most cases, the peaceful transition from war to peace requires a large number 
of conflict management efforts. Birger Heldt found that there were an average of 30 
third-party conflict management peace-making attempts for every agreement reached, 
which given the hundreds of peacemaking attempts, efforts, results in a success rate of 
just over three percent for any individual conflict resolution effort.
60
 But looking at each 
resolution effort individually is misleading. The mechanism for success varies greatly, 
both in duration and in outcome, with small or partial settlements hopefully cumulating 
into a long-lasting, full peace agreement. For most successes, it is usually the case that 
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earlier conflict management failures and partial/limited agreements efforts acted as 
ratchet, moving the peace process slowly forward, suggesting assessment of mediation 
requires not just the evaluation of the “final” conflict management effort but rather a 
comprehensive analysis of the sequence of efforts.
61
  
Becoming a mediator requires approval of three key actors. Mediation involves 
both mutual demand (both belligerents have to agree on a mediator) and supply (the 
mediator has to be available and willing) – a demanding set of conditions that limits who 
we observe mediating particular disputes.
62
 
In addition to the large number of mediation efforts, conflict management often 
involves a large number of third parties. In some cases, multiple third-parties 
simultaneously facilitate a single-conflict management effort. Multiple mediators and 
numerous actors at the table can help, or as often occurs, hinder, peacemaking.
63
 More 
often, the ongoing sequence of mediation efforts involves the replacement of mediators, 
with one mediator after another filling the third-party role. As a result, peacemaking 
efforts in an interstate war might involve a dozen different mediators. Some mediators 
have a specialty at starting or ending the peace process, while the involvement of others 
mediators varies with less clarity. Sometimes within the same dispute, a mediator 
employed in an earlier conflict management effort will return later in the process. 
Because mediation represents the interaction of dispute, disputants and mediators, a 
repeat mediator may have similar, or sometimes quite different results, depending on 
what has changed in the dispute and/or among disputants. 
The role of multiple mediators and conflict resolution efforts can be seen clearly 
by looking at US led peace efforts in the former country of Yugoslavia. 
 
Yugoslavia 
Looking at the wars and dispute resolution efforts following the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia show the influences of multiple actors and the impact of multiple outcomes. 
The conflict began in 1989 and largely involved what we now call Bosnia, Croatia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro. The disputes concerning the former Yugoslavia resulted in over 
300,000 deaths. Aghast at the horrific intrastate, interstate, and genocidal violence in a 
country previously perceived as so stable that the Winter Olympics had been held there 
only a few years earlier, the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and United 
Nations (UN) worked feverishly to foster peace.
64
 After repeated negotiations, a US-led 
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peace-making effort finally resulted in agreements, called the Dayton Accords, which 
helped to quell the violence.  
The Dayton Accords were an international agreement that brought to an end the 
Bosnian conflict (1992-1995), the worst conflict in Europe since the Second World War. 
The outcome of the Dayton Accords, signed by the presidents of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was a General Framework 
Agreement for Peace that called for the mutual recognition of the sovereign equality of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
65
  
But the Dayton Accords followed on the heels of almost one-hundred peace 
agreements among the former Yugoslavian actors. 35% of these settlements failed to last 
a week and another 15% lasted less than two weeks. Thus, understanding the ability of 
the US to facilitate peace requires also examining the hundreds of earlier efforts by other 
actors and putting the Dayton Accords into the context of a much larger sequence. 
The first EC mediation attempt was that led by Jose Cutiliero and Lord 
Carrington, the two chief negotiators for the body in February 1992. The mediation 
efforts culminated in the Cutiliero-Carrington peace plan that proposed a division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into three autonomous units along ethnic lines.
66
 The Cutiliero-
Carrington Plan failed to produce a lasting peace agreement, following which the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was established in September 
1992 to consolidate the peace-making efforts of the European Community (EC) and the 
United Nations (UN). The ICFY had 2 co-chairs, Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance, 
representing the 2 bodies respectively. Three separate peace initiatives for Bosnia were 
drawn up by the ICFY: the Vance-Owen plan, the Owen- Stoltenberg plan (also known 
as the Invincible plan, named after the British warship where the principals met) and the 
EU action plan.
67
 All three plans were also unsuccessful in resolving the conflict for 
varying reasons. 
The effect of having multiple, independent mediation efforts running concurrently 
was the apparent lack of a unified and consistent position on the conflict. Goldstein and 
Pevehouse write that: “President Clinton and the UN Security Council showed 
ambivalence by advocating containment in words but accommodation in deeds.” 
68
 It 
should also be noted that up to this point the US was not formally party to the mediation 
process (former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was a special UN envoy). 
The US became formally involved in the mediation efforts through the 
establishment of the Five Nation Contact Group: Britain, France, Germany, and Russia 
were the other four members.
69
 The formation of the Contact Group was in part a 
                                                 
65
 For a discussion of the extension series of negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords, see DEREK H. 
CHOLLET, THE ROAD TO THE DAYTON ACCORDS:  A STUDY OF AMERICAN STATECRAFT (2006). 
 
66
 Nimet Beriker Atiyas, Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 542 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 185, 190 (1995). 
 
67
 Jutta Paczulla, The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton: Peace efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 60 INT’L J. 
255, 258 (2004). 
 
68
 See Joshua S. Goldstein & Jon C. Pevehouse, Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: 
Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict, 91(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 518 (1997). 
 
69




realization of the need for a consolidated approach to the mediation efforts, “an attempt 
to institutionalize a coordinated mediation effort by building on existing co-
operation.”
70
The Contact Group came into being on 19 April 1994, providing a 
deliberately informal framework for mediation. It comprised a committee of 




The US then assumed leadership of the conflict management efforts, which 
involved both peaceful and military actions. With Richard Holbrooke’s appointment as 
chief US negotiator, the US became much more engaged in the mediation process. 
Marking a departure from an earlier position of relative passivity, the US introduced 
ground forces into Bosnia. This strategy of using both diplomatic and military means to 
attain an outcome in the conflict management process has been termed “coercive 
mediation.”
72
 In this instance, the US did not maintain a neutral position as some 
literature suggests negotiators should, rather, a combination of military force and 
diplomacy ensured a successful outcome was realized.
73
 
NATO also played a crucial supportive role in the mediation and peacekeeping 
efforts to end the conflict. Its military air strikes and overall aggressive actions towards 
the end of the conflict highlighted the important role that regional organizations (in this 
case a security organization) can play in mediation efforts.
74
  
The US has been lauded for its decisive role in the Dayton Accords that ended the 
conflict, and rightly so. The involvement of the other members of the Contact Group was 
also important. The Dayton Accords bring to the fore two important questions for 
understanding conflict management: 1) how effective is multiparty mediation in resolving 
conflicts and 2) how do successful conflict management efforts depend on past failures? 
As discussed earlier, it is not always clear that having multiple actors in a mediation 
effort produces successful outcomes.
75
 In this case however, the multiparty Contact 
Group was successful in delivering a peace agreement.
76
  
The former Yugoslavia case reflects the challenge of understanding and 
evaluating the complex world of peacemaking. On the one hand, third-party mediation 
seemed to be a largely failed process, most of the efforts resulted in no agreements, and 
most of the agreements failed. The world’s most powerful countries and international 
organizations were unable to contain the spread of violence in the Balkans. The majority 
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of almost 100 treaties failed almost immediately, seemingly mocking the peace-making 
process. Hundreds of thousands of people died.  
On the other hand, third-party mediation of the conflict did result in the Dayton 
Accords and the other settlements that eventually subdued the violence and drew a new, 
largely peaceful map of the Balkans. So, in the end, the mixed results of the Yugoslavia 
mediation efforts and other successes and failures convey a complex and contradictory 
story about the effectiveness of peace-making that both shows the importance of multiple 




Another factor often cited as an important determinant of the effectiveness or 
success of mediation concerns how different mediation styles of behavior or strategies 
affect outcomes.
77
 When attempting to peacefully resolve a dispute, third-party mediators 
typically employ three types of mediation strategies:
78
 Communications (facilitate 
exchange of information), Procedural (structure the negotiation process), and Directive 
(shape potential outcomes).  
Communication-Facilitation focuses on efforts that encourage the disputants to 
talk. The talking might be direct, belligerent-to-belligerent, or occur through the mediator 
(e.g. shuttle diplomacy). With communication-facilitation, a mediator solely provides 
information to the parties, like Norway’s role in the Oslo agreement between Israel and 
the PLO. Communications-Facilitation is the most common strategy in interstate dispute 
mediation, occurring in 43.7% of the cases.  
Mediators employing Procedural mediation structure the negotiations. With 
procedural strategies, mediators exert control over structural aspects of the meetings, 
interactions with the media, and communication processes, such as New Zealand 
mediations of the Bougainville conflict in 1995. For example, the mediator might declare 
topic B initially off limits while discussion of topic A commences. Procedural mediation 
occurs in 14.2% of the cases. 
Directive mediation strategy structures an outcome. The mediator might propose a 
specific outcome and look to rally support for it. Or the mediator might contribute 
resources to make an outcome more attractive. Directive mediation strategies are 
employed in 29.6% of interstate conflict management efforts.
79
 An example of a 
Directive Strategy is the billion dollar aid guarantee provided by President Carter to both 
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The three strategies can be ordered in terms of their intensity of mediator 
involvement: Directive> Procedural >Communication. “Directive Strategies constitute 
the most robust and intense form of mediation.”
81
 It is widely argued that the more 
powerful and intense the strategy, the more likely mediators are to achieve successful 
results.
82
 Summing up the view, Bercovitch and Houston argue that regarding mediation 
approaches, “Directive Strategies appear to be the most successful.”
83
  
The choice and effectiveness of mediation strategies is situational and depends on 
the actors and the dispute. For example, directive strategies are pushy. They are effective 
in high intensity conflicts where outcomes are unlikely to occur without a “shove” and 
lead to improved odds for both ceasefires and full settlements. These aggressive 
strategies however, are not as effective in less intense disputes, where they come off as 
pushy and may lead to a reactive lack of cooperation. In these less intense situations, 
mediators may do better with less intrusive conflict management strategies. Balance and 
context are the keys. The effectiveness of all peace-making and peace-keeping actions 
and even definitions of success are highly context-dependent,
84
 a dynamic illustrated by 
examining the choices and effectiveness of President Theodore’s Roosevelt’s efforts to 
end the Russo-Japanese war. 
 
Mediation Strategies: The Russo-Japanese War 
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 came to an end following the signing of the 
Portsmouth Treaty in 1905. The peace agreement signed in New Hampshire, settled, 
albeit temporarily, long-running territorial disputes between Russia and Japan in the 
region.
85
 The negotiations that led to the agreement were conducted under the auspices of 
US President Theodore Roosevelt’s office. For his role in bringing the war to a 
conclusion, Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906. 
There were four main issues that formed the crux of the Portsmouth peace talks: 
Korea, Manchuria, Sakhalin, and indemnity. The final terms reached during the 
negotiations on all the four issues were highly in favor of Japan,
86
 somewhat a reflection 
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of Roosevelt’s initial pro-Japanese position. American support of Japan was “a product of 
its political, strategic, and economic interests in East Asia.”
87
 
President Roosevelt’s decision to be actively engaged in the mediation efforts in 
the Russo-Japanese War, at a time when America’s role as a major player in the 
international system was nascent, can be understood to be twofold. Firstly, there was a 
deliberate attempt by Roosevelt to create an outcome in the war that would benefit 
American national interests, i.e. to maintain a balance of power in the Far East. Such a 
strategy would be beneficial by expanding American commercial interests in the region, 
primarily in Manchuria.
88
 By balancing competing Russian and Japanese interests in the 
region and exploiting the uneasy truce between the two nations, the US would expand its 
trade interests in the region. The “balanced antagonism” in the region would be the ideal 
outcome for ever-expanding American interests.
89
 Secondly, it has also been argued that 
his decision to mediate was for personal reasons, i.e. “his personal motive was to 
establish a reputation as a world statesman.”
90
 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the region shifted over time as was reflected in the 
mediation efforts leading to the peace agreement. Initially in favor of a Japanese victory 
in the war, Roosevelt’s position shifted somewhat as fears of Japanese dominance in the 
region emerged.
91
 In Roosevelt’s view, “Japan was “"playing our game" in the Far East, 
and he looked increasingly to Japan not only to contain Russian imperialism but also to 
stabilize the Far East.”
92
 Russia on the other hand was initially viewed as the ‘enemy’, 
acting against the commercial interests of America by attempting to monopolize trade in 
Manchuria.
93
 It was against this backdrop that Roosevelt initiated the peace talks between 
Russia and Japan, with clear objectives in mind. 
An examination of Roosevelt’s role as a third-party intervener during the peace 
talks reveals an evolution from “convener to active intermediary”, which allowed him, in 
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part, to affect the outcome.
94
 This evolving role enabled him to “initiate talks, propose a 
site, and provide legitimacy or pretenses for conciliatory moves.”
95
 
The Russo-Japanese case also brings to question the importance of mediator 
influence and/or leverage in conflict resolution. It has been noted that “when Roosevelt 
mediated between Russia and Japan at Portsmouth in 1905, he had relatively little 
leverage compared to the other great powers.”
96
 Roosevelt’s role in the peace talks 
“demonstrates that long-term peace also can be attainable if leverage is used sparingly so 
that there is no need for the third party to maintain its influence over time.”
97
 Roosevelt’s 
lack of leverage, militarily and economically, is perhaps reflected in his initial role as 
“convener” in the negotiating process. This behind-the-scenes role, and change in 




Mediation is one of the most prevalent and commonly touted forms of 
international conflict management. Yet, compared to other forms of peacemaking such as 
bilateral negotiation, international disputes that receive mediation are less likely to result 
in peace agreements, and mediated agreements are more likely to fail.
 98
 Furthermore, 
data seem to suggest the opposite of what is commonly believed about specific types of 
mediation.
99
 Why does mediation seem to have such poor results? It is a problem of 
deceptive appearances. A concept called “selection effects” exerts powerful negative 
influences on what we observe; ostensibly suggesting that mediation produces poor 
conflict management outcomes. In reality, appearances deceive. Three aspects of 
international dispute mediation are critical for understanding these deceptive results: 1) 
participation in mediation and adherence to mediated outcomes is voluntary; 2) mediation 
is costly, and 3) the voluntary and costly nature of mediation combine to create Process 
and Selection effects that can greatly distort the inferences we make from our empirical 
observations. 
As discussed earlier in the section on mediation mechanics, international dispute 
mediation is a completely voluntary process – no judge can order belligerents or a third-
party mediator to participate.
 
The third-party mediator must be willing to offer assistance, 
and the belligerents must be willing on their own accord to accept the third-party’s offer 
to mediate.
100 
Unlike binding arbitration, mediation does not require a commitment in 
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advance to accept an outcome. Adherence to a settlement reached through mediation 
requires the voluntary agreement of the disputants.  
Mediation costs are “considerable.”
101
 The costs of mediation vary with the type 
of actor. Belligerents look at the human, economic, and diplomatic costs of additional 
violence, their likelihood of victory, and the various costs of mediation when considering 
conflict resolution. In an interstate war, leaders fear looking weak against both their 
current and possible future adversaries. For example, in 2003, the major reason that 
Saddam Hussein refused to agree to US demands to allow inspectors to search for WMDs 
(even though he didn’t have any) was that he was afraid it would make Iraq look weak 
against Iran – a country he feared more than the US (the two nations had previously 
fought a war that resulted in a million dead and ended in 1988).
102
 In a civil war, 
governments take a dim view of appearing to increase the stature of insurgents by sitting 
with them as apparent equals at the peacemaking table.
103
 Insurgents might be concerned 
that they lack any control over mediation outcomes given their power asymmetry with a 
standing government. Thus for states actively engaged in conflict, mediation might be 
highly unattractive. 
Mediators’ costs include: (1) forgoing other peace efforts; (2) damage to 
reputation from failure; (3) political costs; and, (4) operational expenses (e.g., 
salaries,).
104
 The voluntary and costly nature of mediation combine to create powerful 
process and selection effects – dynamics essential for understanding mediation outcomes.  
The distinction between process and selection effects represents a critical 
innovation in studies of dispute resolution.
105
 Mediators can choose among a wide variety 
of tools when working to resolve disputes.
106
 Process effects reflect choices made during 
conflict management that directly influence outcomes, such as mediator strategy. For 
example, during the negotiations with Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin, U.S. President Jimmy Carter guaranteed U.S. funding for military bases 
to both countries, a move that greatly contributed to the successful Camp David Peace 
Accords. Carter’s guaranty, a directive strategy, is an example of a process effect – an 
action that directly influences the mediation outcome. Process effects have a clear, causal 
effect on conflict management results – they shape dispute resolution success and failure. 
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 Selection effects identify specific populations of cases that have particular conflict 
management traits. For example, imagine there are two types of disputes, hard (difficult 
to resolve) and easy (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes typically involve 
higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more intransigent belligerents than easy to 
resolve disputes. While a great mediator might achieve success in a hard dispute and a 
poor mediator may fail to settle an easily resolvable dispute, on average, hard disputes are 
less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy ones. Thus, identifying the 
dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to predict the likely outcome of any conflict 
resolution. Selection effects identify a dispute’s type. They distinguish the population to 
which disputes belong; but unlike process effects, they do not directly affect the conflict 
management process. Rather, selection effects signal the conflict’s likely type and thus its 
odds of a peaceful outcome.
107
 
The difference between selection and process effects can be illustrated by 
comparing a student clinic and university hospital.
108
 The clinic refers serious cases to the 
hospital. The hospital treats the high risk cases – those with a greater chance of resulting 
in a fatality (selection effect). The hospital has superior medical resources and provides 
better treatment (process effect). Given a serious illnesses, students go to the hospital, 
even if its mortality rates are higher. Students thus take into account (likely without 
thinking about it) selection effects; they recognize that the population of patients at the 
hospital is sicker and more likely to die than the population of patients at the clinic. 
Without consideration of the influence of selection, one would erroneously determine that 




Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it. Disputants who talk 
between themselves and resolve their differences on their own do not have to bear the 
costs of mediation. Thus, bilateral negotiation between disputants represents the most 
efficient, low cost, conflict resolution mechanism (and are especially common in 
interstate conflicts). If bilateral negotiations fail or their differences make them unwilling 
to work together (for example Sadat and Begin refused to be together in the same room 
after their first meeting at Camp David), then disputants who want a peaceful resolution 
process turn to a third-party mediator. As a result, mediators work on tougher cases than 
those bilaterally negotiated; disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less 
likely to result in peace. Mediation itself, however, has positive process effects. An 
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identical dispute would be more likely to result in peace if it is mediated than if it is not. 
But in reality, disputes are not distributed randomly or evenly, among conflict resolution 
processes– mediators get the hardest cases, which are more likely to result in 
peacemaking failure. When the nature of the dispute is taken into account, analyses show 




Even within mediated disputes, selection effects can influence what we observe. 
Selection plays an important role in understanding the frequent and continued failure of 
American presidents to mediate the Israeli/Palestine dispute. 
 
The Israeli/Palestine Conflict 
Selection effects represent the “factors that identify the population to which 
disputes belong; they do not make a dispute harder or easier (they have no direct effect), 
but rather signal the likely nature of the dispute.”
111
 As a result of selection effects “the 
most intractable conflicts are those that often receive attention by the greatest number of 
skilled mediators.”
112
 The long-running Israeli/Palestine conflict falls in this category of 
“intractable conflicts.” 
In the middle of his second term, President Clinton needed domestic and global 
prestige. The Lewinsky scandal and ensuing impeachment had cost him enormous 
political capital, and internationally, there was no end in sight to the US-led Kosovo 
military action. The enormous prestige of achieving success in the Israeli/Palestine 
conflict represented one of the few conflict management successes with the potential to 
resurrect his Administration’s domestic and foreign reputation.
113
 These pressures made 
obtaining an agreement in the Israeli/Palestine conflict tremendously attractive for 
Clinton politically, despite the domestic and international political risks involved in both 
the negotiations and a possible failed outcome. Looking beyond the present crises, 
“Clinton was in the last six months of his presidency, and needed the deal for his 
legacy.”
114
 As Swisher writes, “[t]here would, no doubt, be significant risks if he 
redoubled these efforts… But there could also be significant payoffs.”
115
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During President Clinton’s tenure, the strongest indication of American 
willingness to mediate the Israeli/Palestine conflict culminated in the Camp David talks 
in July 2000, a throwback to Jimmy Carter’s successful initiative (which led to the 
prestigious Nobel Peace Prize). The talks followed the 1999 election to power of Ehud 
Barak in Israel. The negotiations, which lasted two weeks, did not produce a substantive 
outcome and were deemed a failure, with long-term, negative consequences for the 
region that were “momentous.”
 116
 
Multiple reasons have been offered as to why the talks failed, amongst these are: 
PLO Chairman Arafat’s lack of flexibility; Barak’s lack of resolve; and Clinton’s taking 
sides, applying misplaced pressure, failing to involve Arab states earlier in the process, 
and losing precious time before tabling his own proposals.
117
 
Other views hold it that Clinton’s failure to conclude a deal between the 
Palestinians and Israelis can be attributed to the rushed way the Camp David summit was 
organized. One opinion states that “by rushing into the Camp David summit, determined 
to resolve in a few days what are profound and long-standing differences, President 
Clinton created unrealistic expectations.”
118
 According to US Deputy Assistant Director 




Given the existence of a host of nuanced, underlying issues that accompany the 
territorial issues of the Israeli/Palestine conflict, a rushed summit had very little chance of 
succeeding. Given the above backdrop, it was unlikely that Clinton, a reputed meticulous 
politician, would successfully conclude a peace agreement between the disputants. 
Clinton made a second attempt to broker a deal, bringing the two parties together 
in December 2000 to the White House. This second initiative is best remembered for two 
things: firstly, Clinton broke tradition in making specific proposals during the 
negotiations and going beyond the general UN frameworks (Resolutions 242 and 338), 
the cornerstones of US policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the first time an American 
president had done so.
120
 Secondly, Yasser Arafat walked away from a supposedly 
“better” proposal from the Americans. In doing so, Arafat condemned Clinton’s last 
attempt at reaching a peace agreement a complete failure. 
President Obama, who came to power on the back of election promises to restore 
diplomacy as the preferred American means of conflict resolution, signaled early on in 
his presidency the seriousness with which he regarded mediation of the Israeli/Palestine 
conflict. On his first day in office, the President telephoned PA President Mahmud 
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Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and two other Arab leaders. The intention 
was to “communicate his commitment to active engagement in pursuit of Arab-Israeli 
peace from the beginning of his term.”
121
 Unlike his predecessor Bush, Obama was quick 
to appoint a special envoy to the Middle East to lead the mediation efforts. What these 
moves by Obama signaled was an express intention to mediate between the disputing 
parties in the conflict. 
However, despite active engagement and the gestures made above to break the 
deadlock, including the appointment of widely-respected and experienced mediator, 
former Senator George Mitchell, Obama has been unable to bring the two parties any 
closer towards an agreement. Towards the end of Obama’s first term in office, there were 
suggestions that he had lost the support of both the Israelis and Palestinians in the peace 
process because of his failure to fulfill promises made to either side.
122
  
The likelihood of success for any mediator at any time to resolve the 
Israeli/Palestine dispute is very low. The leaders of Israel and Palestine often display 
hardline stances which reduce the chances of success of any mediation efforts. After 
President Obama came into office, Benjamin Netanyahu was reelected as prime minister 
of Israel, his second stint. Netanyahu, while publicly stating his support for a two-state 
solution, has in practice not displayed a willingness to budge on his coalition’s position 




Both Obama and Clinton chose the dispute because of the prestige that would 
result from bringing peace to this long-running and globally salient dispute – factors that 
flow directly from the dispute’s intrinsic intractability. As leader of the most powerful 
country in the world, US presidents cannot offer to mediate every dispute and likely 
anticipate that only success in the most hard to resolve disputes will augment their 
prestige. Thus it is not surprising that American presidents, including most recently 
President Obama, continually try to mediate the dispute between Israel and Palestine and 
continually fail. The reasons they select this dispute for mediation and the reasons for 
their failure are related.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mediation represents a common and powerful method for peacefully resolving 
interstate conflicts. Third Party mediation, whether domestic or international, has a 
number of critical attributes such as disputants, mediator, dispute and outcome. How 
these mechanisms work, however, varies tremendous between domestic and international 
contexts. The lack of enforceable processes and outcomes, even in the face of 
increasingly powerful norms of cooperation and implementation, produces an enormous 
constraint on efforts to resolve violent international disputes. Given the anarchic 
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international environment, mediation represents a highly attractive dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
The application of mediation to violent international disputes, however, generates 
recently uncovered patterns that diverge greatly from domestic mediation experiences. 
These patterns include: 1) the effective role of biased mediators, 2) the importance of 
numerous mediators and mediation efforts, 3) the context-dependent effect of mediator 
strategy, and 4) the deceptive influence of selection effects on inferences drawn from 
observing mediation behavior. These patterns give insight into the dynamics of interstate 
conflict mediation. A systematic review of both international dispute mediation 
mechanics as well as these four critical mediation patterns provides a critical step towards 
developing a richer understanding of the similarities and differences between domestic 
mediation and the mediation of violent international conflicts. 
